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Dadiego: The Big Picture

THE BIG PICTURE VIEW OF ANONYMOUS TIPS FROM
ORDINARY PEOPLE
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Argyris1
(decided November 25, 2014)

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”2 The purpose is to protect individuals from being searched
or arrested based upon mere suspicion or a rumor.3 A search or seizure is reasonable, and therefore constitutional, when law enforcement has reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Courts throughout
the country have been faced with the issue of whether anonymous
tips that lead police to conduct a “stop and frisk” could be deemed
constitutional.4 Anonymous tips can create a cause for concern when
the informant uses law enforcement in an attempt to harass, blackmail, or embarrass a potential defendant.
This Case Note will discuss the issue presented to the New
York State Court of Appeals in People v. Agryris—whether there was
reasonable suspicion, to justify the search and seizure of the defendant’s vehicle and firearm on the basis of an anonymous 911 phone
call. This Note will recommend that New York adopt a practical, totality of the circumstances approach used by a majority of the states.5
Section II will discuss the facts and procedural background of Ag1

27 N.E.3d 425 (N.Y. 2014).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
3 People v. Elwell, 406 N.E.2d 471, 480 (N.Y. 1980) (Jasen, J., dissenting).
4 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990);
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000); People v. Moore, 847 N.E.2d 1141 (N.Y. 2006); People
v. Rios, 898 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. 2010).
5 See infra note 244 (stating that only six states, including New York, apply the AguilarSpinelli test).
2
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ryris. Section III will provide an overview and brief history of the
doctrine of reasonable suspicion. Section IV will address when an
anonymous tip may serve as a basis for reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify a reasonable search or seizure. Section V will
address the background of New York law in relation to anonymous
tips. Finally, Section VI will apply the relevant law to the facts of
Agryris.
II.

PEOPLE V. ARGYRIS
A.

Factual and Procedural Background

On July 19, 2007, the police received a 911 phone call from
an unidentified man.6 The caller explained to the operator that after
exiting a building on New Town Avenue and 31st Street in Astoria,
New York he witnessed four “big bully white guys” enter a new
black Mustang.7 The caller provided the operator with the license
plate number of the Mustang.8 He added that one of the men put a
gun into the back of the vehicle and observed a gray van accompany
the Mustang as it drove away.9 Next, the caller stated that the vehicle
and the van went down the block and turned right.10 Although the
caller described the gunman’s appearance as a “tall big bully white
guy[],” the caller was unable to identify the defendant’s clothing or
any other distinctive traits.11 The caller declined to reveal his identity
to the operator.12 The 911 operator attempted to send police to meet
the caller, but he left before the police arrived at the scene.13
Approximately fifteen minutes after the call was made, Officer Castelli, a New York City police officer, located a black Mustang with a matching license plate number.14 Castelli followed the
Mustang and reported via radio to inform other officers.15 After re6

Argyris, 27 N.E.3d at 429 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring).
Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Argyris, 27 N.E.3d at 429 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring).
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
7
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ceiving the radio report, Sergeant Bauso spotted the Mustang at a
traffic light and left his vehicle to get a better look at the license plate
number.16 Once he confirmed the license plate number, he pointed to
the vehicle and instructed the driver to pull over.17 However, the
driver failed to comply and Bauso returned to his vehicle to follow
the Mustang.18 The Mustang continued to drive and parted ways with
the van.19 Officer Valles spotted the Mustang, followed it, and called
for backup.20 Valles exited his vehicle, pointed his gun at the Mustang, and ordered the occupants to exit the vehicle.21 Sergeant Bauso
and six other officers arrived on the scene and aimed their guns at the
Mustang.22
Officer Valles ordered the occupants to exit the vehicle one
by one.23 The defendant, Costandino Argyris, an occupant in the
Mustang, wore a bulletproof vest that was visible when he exited the
vehicle.24 Officer Valles searched Argyris and discovered a metal
and leather club along with a switchblade when he searched Argyris.25 Officer Valles searched the vehicle and discovered a loaded
.38 caliber handgun under the driver’s seat, as well as a box of 9 millimeter ammunition on the back seat.26
Before the commencement of trial, the defendant moved to
suppress the physical evidence recovered by police.27 The New York
State Supreme Court Queens County ultimately denied the defendant’s motion to reargue and the defendant entered a plea of guilty.28
Next, the defendant appealed from the judgment of conviction.29 The
New York State Supreme Court Appellate Division, Second Department, emphasized that these circumstances did not require the application of the Aguilar-Spinelli test because the standard of review is

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Argyris, 27 N.E.3d at 429 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Argyris, 27 N.E.3d at 429 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring).
Id. at 429-30.
Id. at 430.
Id.
Id.
Argyris, 27 N.E.3d at 430 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 431.
Id.
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merely reasonable suspicion.30 The court determined that Officer
Valles had a basis to suspect that the defendant may be in criminal
possession of a weapon.31 The court found that reasonable suspicion
was established from the anonymous informant accurately providing
the police with (i) a description of the vehicle, (ii) license plate number, and (iii) the location of the vehicle in relation to where it was
first spotted by the informant.32 The informant’s information was reliable, because it was a contemporaneous observation.33 The court
stated that the police officers were justified in drawing their guns to
ensure their safety when ordering the defendant to exit the vehicle.34
Accordingly, the court held that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the physical evidence seized from the
defendant’s person and vehicle.35
B. The New York Court of Appeals Decision
The New York Court of Appeals held that the police stop was
lawful whether the court applied either the totality of the circumstances test or the Aguilar-Spinelli test.36 However, the AguilarSpinelli test does not typically apply to situations regarding reasonable suspicion.37 The court determined through a combination of the
contents of the anonymous 911 call and the confirmatory observations from the police that reasonable suspicion was successfully established.38 Reasonable suspicion was established because the anon30

Id.
Argyris, 27 N.E.3d at 431 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring).
32 Id.; Reasonable suspicion is defined as “a particularized and objective basis, supported
by specific and articulable facts, for suspecting a person of criminal activity. Reasonable
Suspicion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) defines A police officer must have a
reasonable suspicion to stop a person in a public place.” In White, the Court stated
[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause
not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with
information that is different in quantity or content than that required to
establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion
can arise form information that is less reliable than that required to show
probable cause.
White, 496 U.S. at 330; see supra Part I.B for a discussion of the Aguilar-Spinelli test.
33 Argyris, 27 N.E.3d at 431 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 426.
37 Id. at 427.
38 Argyris, 27 N.E.3d at 426.
31
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ymous 911 call contained sufficient information about the unlawful
possession of a weapon.39
Judge Smith’s concurring opinion considered whether Aguilar-Spinelli should be applied to stops that merely require reasonable
suspicion.40 Before this case, Aguilar-Spinelli was traditionally applied to New York cases that faced the issue of probable cause, not
reasonable suspicion.41 Smith noted, if Aguilar-Spinelli should be
used to establish reasonable suspicion, the court would be obligated
to establish that a reasonable person could suspect the informant had
an adequate basis of knowledge and that knowledge stemmed from a
credible or reliable source.42 Therefore, Judge Smith, along with four
other judges, rejected the idea that Aguilar-Spinelli should be applied
in circumstances that solely require reasonable suspicion because it
would unnecessarily complicate reasonable suspicion issues.43
III.

REASONABLE SUSPICION
A.

Terry v. Ohio

The leading case for law enforcement’s ability to “stop and
frisk” suspicious individuals is Terry v. Ohio.44 In 1968, the United
States Supreme Court was asked to examine a street confrontation between an individual and the police on the basis of suspicious circumstances.45 In Terry, an experienced detective stopped two men who
were acting suspiciously in an area known for shoplifting and pickpocketing.46 The detective, Officer McFadden, patrolled the same vicinity for 30 years.47 During his patrol, he observed three men acting
suspiciously and started to follow them because he suspected that

39

Id.
Id. at 427 (Smith, J., concurring).
41 Id. The court explained two New York Court of Appeals cases that mentioned AguilarSpinelli to determine lack of probable cause. People v. Landy, 452 N.E.2d 1185 (N.Y. 1983)
(holding Aguilar-Spinelli rule established no probable cause); People v. Chase, 650 N.E.2d
379 (N.Y. 1995) (holding lack of probable cause based on Aguilar-Spinelli).
42 Argyris, 27 N.E.3d at 427 (Smith, J., concurring).
43 Id.
44 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
45 Id. at 4.
46 Id. at 5.
47 Id.
40
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they were planning a robbery.48 He eventually approached the men
and asked for their names and the men mumbled something in return.49 Officer McFadden then grabbed Terry, spun him around, patted him down outside of his clothes, and felt a pistol.50 After his arrest for criminal possession of a firearm, Terry’s motion to suppress
the pistol was denied.51
The Supreme Court held that an objective standard must be
used to decide whether there was probable cause to conduct a
search.52 An objective standard is met when the facts presented to the
officer at the time of the search created a belief that further investigation is necessary to address the potential criminal activity afoot.53
The Court opted for a fact sensitive approach rather than creating a
bright line rule. The Court also explained that the officer did not
need to be certain that the individual was armed.54 It was further noted that a reasonably prudent person standard was appropriate when
an officer believes his safety or that of the police is at jeopardy.55
Accordingly, an officer may not act based on a suspicion, but rather
on specific reasonable inferences derived from his experiences.56 Ultimately, the Court decided that the search in this situation was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.57
B.

Aguilar-Spinelli Test

The Supreme Court developed the Aguilar-Spinelli test—a
two-pronged test used to determine whether an informant’s tip provides probable cause.58 This test safeguards an individual’s Fourth
48 Id. at 5-6. In New York, under the De Bour test this would be considered Level 2 Reasonable Suspicion. People v. De Bour, 352 N.E.2d 562 (N.Y. 1976).
49 Terry, 392 U.S. at 6-7.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 21-22.
53 Id.
54 Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 31.
58 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
Probable cause is defined as:
A reasonable ground to suspect that a person has committed or is committing a crime or that a place contains specific items connected with a
crime. Under the Fourth Amendment, probable cause—which amounts
to more than a bare suspicion but less than evidence that would justify a
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Amendment rights, and allows the police to utilize informant-based
tips in certain situations.59 Under this test, a police officer must offer
facts to verify the informant’s basis of knowledge and reliability for a
search or seizure to be deemed constitutionality proper.60 The Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas created the two-pronged test to determine when a “substantial basis” is present to obtain a warrant or
conduct a warrantless search based upon an anonymous tip from an
informant.61 The first prong, “basis of knowledge,” is satisfied when
an informant obtains his knowledge through personal observation or
in a reliable manner.62 The second prong, known as the veracity
prong, requires an officer to provide facts necessary to establish that
the informant possesses credibility or his information is reliable.63
This can be simply satisfied with a showing that the informant has
provided the police with accurate information in the past.64
Five years after the Aguilar test was established, the Supreme
Court refined and clarified the test in Spinelli v. United States.65 In
Spinelli, the Court noted that a tip is based on an informant’s personal
knowledge when he is able to give an accurate and detailed description of how the information was established or became known to
him.66 If a tip fails to satisfy one or both of the prongs—probable
cause may be established by a police investigation that relies the
tip—to support an inference that the informant was a trustworthy
source and that he obtained the information in a reliable way.67 If an
officer wishes to rely on corroboration, the next step is whether the

conviction—must be shown before an arrest warrant or search warrant
may be issued.
Probable Cause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
59 Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 112.
60 Id. at 114.
Magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances
from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he
claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from
which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not
be disclosed, . . . was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable.’
Id.
61 Id. at 111.
62 Id. at 114.
63 Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114.
64 Id.
65 Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 410.
66 Id. at 416.
67 Id. at 418.
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corroborative tip can pass the two-prong Aguilar test without independent corroboration.68
C.

Totality of the Circumstances—Illinois v. Gates

The United States Supreme Court abandoned the AguilarSpinelli test fourteen years later in its ruling in Illinois v. Gates.69 In
May of 1978, the Bloomingdale Police Department received an
anonymous handwritten letter informing them that Lance and Susan
Gates made their living by selling drugs.70 The letter revealed the location of their condominium along with their method of obtaining
drugs from Florida.71 The letter provided a detailed account of future
conduct relating to the Gates’ involvement with drug trafficking.72
Detective Mader investigated the tip and discovered that
Lance’s license was registered to the same address provided in the
letter.73 Further investigation revealed that Lance had an airline reservation to Florida from Chicago.74 An agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration reported to Mader that Lance was in Florida and was in a hotel room registered to Susan.75 The next day Lance
and an unidentified woman left the hotel in a vehicle registered to
Gates in route to Chicago.76 Mader then submitted the anonymous
letter to a judge to obtain a warrant to search the Gates’ vehicle and
home.77 The actions that Gates took were the same as specified in the
letter with the exception of an unidentified woman driving back to Illinois with him.78 The police were waiting at the Gates’ home and
subsequently searched the vehicle’s trunk to discover 350 pounds of
marijuana.79
68

Id. at 416.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238.
70 Id. at 225.
71 Id.
72 Id. The anonymous informant stated on May 3rd Susan would be diving their vehicle
from Chicago to Florida and fly back home. Id. The letter also stated that Lance would then
pick up the vehicle and drive it from Florida back to Chicago with $100,000 worth of drugs
in the trunk. Gates, 462 U.S. at 225.
73 Id. at 225-26.
74 Id. at 226.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Gates, 462 U.S. at 226.
78 Id. at 226-27.
79 Id. at 227.
69
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The Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli test and adopted a
“totality of the circumstances” test to establish whether the informant’s tip was sufficient to establish probable cause.80 Probable cause
is more demanding than reasonable suspicion for two reasons.81
First, reasonable suspicion is determined with a different quantity or
content of information than is required for probable cause.82 Second,
probable cause requires a higher degree of reliability.83 In order to
establish reasonable suspicion, quantity and quality are considered
when evaluating “totality of the circumstances.”84 For example, if a
tip lacks reliability then more information is required to establish reasonable suspicion.85 The Court found that the Aguilar-Spinelli test
was too demanding for a probable cause standard to be satisfied by
law enforcement, and was also detrimental to the government’s legitimate interest in preventing crime.86 Importantly, the AguilarSpinelli test could rarely be satisfied when judges were tasked with
issuing search warrants—most likely because anonymous tips are
usually submitted by the general public, that lack necessary information to satisfy the basis of the knowledge prong—namely, the demand for predictability.87 This is because individuals are sometimes
unable to provide the extensive information necessary to satisfy the
“basis of knowledge” and “reliability” prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli
test.88
As previously stated, Terry laid the foundation for “stop and
frisks” and provided that a police officer might establish reasonable
suspicion from his own observations.89 However, this rule does not
consider what happens when tips come from anonymous sources. An
anonymous tip can support reasonable suspicion when the tip contains predictive information.90 In order for a tip to give rise to reasonable suspicion, it must be reliable in its assertion of illegality.91
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id. at 238.
White, 496 U.S. at 330.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
White, 496 U.S. at 330.
Gates, 482 U.S. at 237-38.
Id. at 230.
Id.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31.
See J.L., 529 U.S. at 269.
Id. at 272.
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The totality of the circumstances must be taken into account to determine whether reasonable suspicion exists.92 For years, courts were
asked to determine the issue of whether anonymous tips provided police officers with reasonable suspicion to conduct a lawful stop.
IV.

THE RULE OF REASONABLE SUSPICION IN ANONYMOUS TIPS
A. Alabama v. White

The United States Supreme Court was faced with the issue of
whether an anonymous tip, together with independent police work,
presented sufficient indicia of reliability to provide the reasonable
suspicion necessary to conduct an investigatory stop in the 1990 case,
Alabama v. White.93 In White, the police received an anonymous telephone call that stated White would be leaving an apartment complex
at a certain time and enter a particular vehicle.94 The call further stated that White would be going to a motel with an ounce of cocaine in
a brown case.95 The police went to the apartment complex and witnessed White enter a vehicle that matched the description from the
anonymous tip and proceeded to travel to the motel.96 Shortly before
arriving at the motel, police stopped the vehicle that was suspected of
carrying cocaine.97 White consented to the search and the police
found a brown case in the vehicle, which contained marijuana.98 After arresting White, police found cocaine in her purse.99 White later
challenged the search on the ground that the police lacked reasonable
suspicion when they initially stopped and detained her.
The Court applied the “totality of circumstances” approach
and analyzed both what the police learned through personal observations along with the weight of the anonymous tip.100 To apply the totality of the circumstances analysis, a court uses the same concept as

92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

White, 496 U.S. at 328-29.
Id. at 326-27.
Id. at 327.
Id.
Id.
White, 496 U.S. at 327.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 328.
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used to determine the level of reasonable suspicion.101 The Court
noted that every tip from an anonymous source does not need to be
verified.102 The woman’s name did not require verification because
the location of the apartment complex and the vehicle were the same
as described in the tip—thus, rendering the anonymous tip reliable.103
The Court’s emphasized the importance of the source’s familiarity
with the particulars of the defendant’s actions, because a member of
the general public would not have been able to produce the detail that
was provided in the tip.104 Here, the future behavior of the defendant
was considered such as leaving the building, entering a particular vehicle, and taking a direct route to the motel.105 This information
could have only came from an individual who was familiar with the
defendant’s routine and, therefore, had a sufficient basis of
knowledge of the facts.106 The Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that
when the officers stopped the defendant, the anonymous tip provided
reasonable suspicion to believe that the defendant was involved in
criminal activity.107 Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment was not violated.108
B.

Florida v. J.L.

In Florida v. J.L., the United States Supreme Court was asked
to determine whether an anonymous tip that an individual was carrying a gun, without more information, was adequate to justify a police
officer’s stop and frisk.109 In J.L., the police received an anonymous
telephone call that reported a young black male, wearing a plaid shirt
and carrying a gun, was at a particular bus stop.110 However, there
was no information about the individual providing the tip and no audio recording of the tip.111 The police went to the location and saw
three young black males, one of whom was wearing the plaid shirt
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Id. at 328-29.
White, 496 U.S. at 328.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 331-32.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 331-32.
White, 496 U.S. at 332.
Id.
J.L., 529 U.S. at 268.
Id.
Id.
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that was described.112 But, the officers did not suspect the three
males of any illegal conduct.113 Furthermore, a firearm was not in
sight and there were no threatening movements.114 One of the officers approached J.L. and ordered him to put his hands up, frisked him,
and discovered a gun.115 J.L. was charged with carrying a concealed
firearm without a license and possessing a firearm under the age of
18.116 The defendant then moved to suppress the gun on the ground
that the search was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.117 The
Florida Supreme Court held that the search was invalid under the
Fourth Amendment, because anonymous tips are less reliable than
tips from a known informant and can only result in reasonable suspicion when accompanied by specific indicia of reliability. 118 In this
case, the officer only had a common law right to question the individual, not to search him. Thus, the Florida Supreme Court found
that the tip at issue provided no predictive information or any form of
reliability.119
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the officer’s sole basis for suspicion was grounded on the information provided from the anonymous caller.120 This is different from a known
informant because the known informant has a reputation and is responsible if the allegations are not correct.121 However, an anonymous tip that is sufficiently corroborated and shows reliability to
prove reasonable suspicion is enough for a lawful search.122 The
112

Id.
Id.
114 J.L., 529 U.S. at 268.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 J.L., 529 U.S. at 269.
120 Id. at 270.
121 Id. If the tip is from an unknown informant and is inaccurate then the police are unable
to take action and issue punishment. However, when the tip is from someone who the police
is familiar with and he passes on wrong information then the police can give the necessary
punishment. Id.
122 Id. In analyzing the tip at issue, the Court in J.L. found:
The anonymous call concerning J.L. provided no predictive information
and therefore left the police without means to test the informant’s
knowledge or credibility. That the allegation about the gun turned out to
be correct does not suggest that the officers, prior to the frisks, had a reasonable basis for suspecting J.L. of engaging in unlawful conduct. The
reasonableness of official suspicion must be measured by what the offic113
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Court stated that the tip lacked reliability and the phone call did not
provide information to predict J.L.’s next step.123 The fact that J.L.
possessed a firearm was not enough to provide the police with a reasonable basis to stop and frisk.124 The informant failed to provide
how he knew about the gun or how and why he knew J.L. was in possession of this information.125 Therefore, the Court held that the
search violated J.L.’s Fourth Amendment right because the anonymous tip lacked reliability.126
C.

Navarette v. California

In Navarette v. California,127 the United States Supreme Court
decided the issue of whether the defendant’s Fourth Amendment
rights were violated when an officer had reasonable suspicion,
through a tip, to believe the driver was intoxicated but did not observe the action himself.128 In Navarette, the Mendocino County 911
dispatcher received a phone call from an eyewitness in the neighboring town that stated a Silver Ford license plate 8D94925 was southbound on Highway 1 at mile marker 88 and ran someone off the road
five minutes prior to the call.129 A member of the California Highway Patrol then spotted the vehicle at mile maker 69 and pulled the
vehicle over.130 A scent of marijuana was present and upon investigation, thirty pounds of marijuana were discovered in the truck.131
The petitioners sought to establish that the evidence should be suppressed because the search violated the Fourth Amendment due to
lack of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.132
When evaluating if the officer had reasonable suspicion to
ers knew before they conducted their search. All the police had to go on
in this case was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant
who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis
for believing he had inside information about J.L.
Id. at 271.
J.L., 529 U.S. at 271.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014).
128 Id. at 1686.
129 Id. at 1686-87.
130 Id. at 1687.
131 Id.
132 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1687.
123
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conduct a stop, the Court examined how the tip was established.133
The Court determined that the content of the tip came from the eyewitness victim of the reckless driving.134 In addition, the officer was
able to corroborate the truck’s location, direction, time, and description.135 This corroboration provided the police with a reasonable belief that the 911 caller was telling the truth.136 The Court found that a
contemporaneous report is typically treated as reliable because it refutes the chances of a deliberate misrepresentation.137 Furthermore,
the phone call was enough to justify a stop without the officer observing additional reckless driving due to the nature of the alleged criminal conduct of running someone off the road.138 When applying the
totality of the circumstances, the Court found that since the tipster
stated another vehicle ran her off the road, there was an implication
that the informant knew the driver was acting in a reckless manner.139
The police were able to successfully confirm the truck’s location at
mile maker 69, which was just 19 miles away from the initial sight.140
This distance correctly followed the timeline of events from when the
informant called 911.141
The Navarette Court found that a reliable tip alone is not
enough to justify an investigative stop.142 The tip must be enough to
create reasonable suspicion that the crime is ongoing as opposed to
one isolated incident that is completed.143 Reasonable suspicion is
measured on both the factual and practical considerations used by a
reasonable prudent person.144 Under these circumstances, the Court
examined various driving behaviors that are related to drunk driving.145 Furthermore, in the recent years, 911 systems have been advanced to include features that make it possible to identify and trace
callers to prevent the risk of false reports.146 An individual may face
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1689.
Id.
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1690.
Id.
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996).
Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1690-91.
Id. at 1689.
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prosecution if it was established that a false report was made.147
Regulatory and technological developments, have clearly aided law
enforcement in evaluating the genuineness of an anonymous tip.148
The Court distinguished this case from J.L..149 Here, the 911
caller provided the police with sufficient indicia of reliability that she
was run off the road by providing accurate details such as the driver’s
location.150 In J.L., however, the anonymous caller merely provided
police with information that a male wearing a plaid shirt was in possession of a gun, which was not enough to establish reasonable suspicion because of lack of a prediction for future behavior.151 In
Navarette, it was reasonable to believe that the informant knew that
the driver was acting recklessly when she was driven off the road.152
Therefore, the Court held that the stop was justifiable because the
contents of the phone call gave reason to believe the informant was
credible, when she provided the license plate number, make of the
vehicle, and location.153
Navarette was a 5-4 decision, and Justice Scalia authored the
dissenting opinion.154 Scalia’s concern was that law enforcement officials follow the decisions of the Supreme Court, especially when it
involves traffic stops.155 The new rule that states “[s]o long as the
caller identifies where the car is, anonymous claims of a single instance of possible careless or reckless driving, called in to 911, will
support a traffic stop.”156 Justice Scalia believed that this rule departs
from the view of the Framers of The Constitution.157 The dissenting
opinion noted that the information from the anonymous tip should be
with such particularity that it would not be known to an ordinary person.158 For example, any individual witnessing a vehicle traveling on
a highway in a certain direction may be certain that the vehicle will
147

Id. at 1690.
Id.
149 See supra Section IV.B for a discussion of J.L.
150 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1688-89.
151 J.L., 529 U.S. at 268.
152 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1689.
153 Id. at 1692.
154 Id. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Navarette, 134 S. Ct. at 1692 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This is likely because anonymous,
unsubstantiated tips cast a wide net that in turn creates the intended protection of the Fourth
Amendment.
158 Id. at 1693.
148
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reach another point by a particular time.159 The dissent feared that
this rule would open the door to other new rules that would slip further away from the original intent of the Fourth Amendment.
D. United States v. Simmons
In United States v. Simmons,160 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals discussed whether police had reasonable suspicion, based on
a 911 call, to stop and search the defendant.161 In Simmons, the police received a call that stated an assault was in progress and a black
male with a gray sweatshirt and black jacket may be in possession of
a weapon.162 When the officers arrived, they discovered a group of
people that denied that anyone was injured.163 In addition, there was
no evidence that an assault took place.164 Upon entering the building,
a man who matched the description, approached the officers with his
hands in his pockets and would not remove them when asked.165 One
of the officers grabbed the man’s pocket and felt a gun.166 Next, the
officers searched the defendant and discovered two loaded guns; he
was placed under arrest.167
The court determined that reasonable suspicion was established because the anonymous tip reported an assault and the police,
upon arrival at the scene, spotted a group of individuals present at the
time and location described by the informant.168 The court found that
when the defendant failed to remove his hands from his pocket, the
officer had reasonable cause to grab Simmons’s pockets to ensure his
safety.169 The court applied the standard set forth in Terry, in which
the Supreme Court held that when a police officer observes unusual
conduct, which leads him to believe criminal activity is present or the
person may be armed, he is permitted to make reasonable inquires.170

159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

Id.
560 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 101.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Simmons, 560 F.3d at 101.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 102.
Simmons, 560 F.3d at 103; Terry, 392 U.S. at 30-31.
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When applying Terry, the court examined whether a particularized
and objective basis for suspicion of legal wrongdoing under the totality of the circumstances existed.171
The defendant unsuccessfully relied on the Supreme Court’s
holding in J.L.172 The court reasoned that this case is significantly
different from J.L. because here, the anonymous informant reported
an assault with a weapon that was in progress, while J.L. merely involved a tip that an individual was in possession of a gun.173 The
court noted that an anonymous 911 call made with the purpose of reporting an ongoing emergency demonstrates a higher degree of reliability and therefore a reduced amount of corroboration is required.174
E. Significance of the Federal Approach in relation to
People v. Argyris
The totality of the circumstances standard applied by the federal courts differs from the Aguilar-Spinelli standard that is used by
New York courts. In applying the totality of the circumstances
standard, federal courts give deference to law enforcement and their
efforts. However, an individual’s right against an unreasonable
search is eroded because law enforcement may be able to conjure up
various “conceivable reasons” to justify a search that may be deemed
unreasonable.
The Aguilar-Spinelli standard, commonly utilized by New
York courts, expands on the protections initially provided by the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. This standard
places a demand on law enforcement, with regard to anonymous tips.
At the very least, police officers have to establish that their tip was
reliable enough to justify a stop and possible search.
The two standards utilized by the federal and New York
courts are at far opposite ends of the spectrum. Should courts afford
deference to law enforcement, or chip away at the Fourth Amendment rights of an individual? New York courts have insisted that an
individual’s right against unreasonable search and seizure can trump
law enforcement’s duty to combat crime and promote public safety.
171 Simmons, 560 F.3d at 103; United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18 (1981)).
172 See supra Part IV.B for a discussion of J.L.
173 Simmons, 560 F.3d at 104.
174 Id.
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There may be no middle ground between the two standards.
V.

NEW YORK STATE APPROACH

This Section will discuss New York State’s approach to
anonymous tips. The New York State Constitution provides that
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched . . .
.”175 In other words, a warrantless search is not permitted solely on
the basis of information provided by an informant where there is no
indication of how that information was obtained even if the police
had been able to confirm the tip through their own knowledge. In order for police to conduct a warrantless search, there must be confirmation of sufficient details suggestive of, or directly related to, the
criminal activity to reach the conclusion that the informer did not
simply pass along a rumor or attempt to frame the individual. The
following cases demonstrate how New York courts approach situations where anonymous tips were provided and the standard used to
determine whether a stop is reasonable within the Fourth Amendment
while applying the Aguilar-Spinelli test.
In People v. Johnson,176 the New York Court of Appeals was
asked to determine the minimum factual showing required to support
probable cause in New York.177 In Johnson, Joseph Di Prospro informed police officers that Bolivar Abreu was responsible for the
death of Raymundo Alcantara.178 When questioned by police, Abreu
denied having any information regarding the homicide.179 However,
Abreu ultimately connected Di Prospro and the defendant by disclosing a conversation about the crime.180 The defendant was then arrested and sought to establish that his arrest was unlawful because the
police relied upon hearsay from an individual who did not meet the
requirement of the Aguilar-Spinelli test.181 The court stated that

175
176
177
178
179
180
181

N.Y. CONST. art 1, § 12.
488 N.E.2d 439 (N.Y. 1985).
Id. at 442.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Johnson, 488 N.E.2d at 442.
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probable cause may be established through hearsay information as
long as it meets the requirements of Aguilar-Spinelli.182 In other
words, the informant must be reliable and have a basis of knowledge
for hearsay information to support a probable cause determination.183
Here, the Court of Appeals found that Abreu, the informant,
had a sufficient basis of knowledge because he was able to provide
information to the police based upon his own personal observation by
stating that “during the robbery Di Prospro had pulled out of gun . . .
and that during the struggle Di Prospro fired the gun at the proprietor.”184 Defense counsel argued that notwithstanding this statement,
probable cause was not established because the State failed to show
that Abreu was a reliable informant – the other prong in the AguilarSpinelli test.185 The court stated that an informant can be considered
reliable based on the informant’s past performance, a verification under oath, or an admission against penal interest.186 In Johnson, the
record failed to establish Abreu as a reliable informant due to lack of
previous performances.187 In addition, the statement was not given
under oath.188 The court determined that the Aguilar-Spinelli test was
not satisfied and the only way probable cause could be established in
this case was to apply the totality of the circumstances standard from
Gates.189 However, New York declined to adopt this standard.190
The court reasoned that the New York State Constitution was in conformity with the Fourth Amendment.191 Thus, the New York Court
of Appeals determined when hearsay information is provided in a
warrantless search, the Aguilar-Spinelli test must be satisfied.192 In
this case, the prosecution wanted to apply the totality of the circumstances approach because ultimately, the tip was reliable. However,
outcome determinative tips should not be considered solely for their
result.
In People v. Elwell, the New York Court of Appeals deter182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Johnson, 488 N.E.2d at 442.
Id.
Id. at 443.
Id. at 444.
Id. at 445.
Johnson, 488 N.E.2d at 445.
Id.
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mined whether a warrantless search is permitted when the informant
failed to disclose how the information, which was personal in nature
and not suggestive of criminal activity, was acquired.193 However,
the police were able to confirm the information through their own observations.194 In Elwell, Charles Hancock, an investigator, received a
phone call from a reliable informant whom he had interacted with on
prior occasions.195 The informant stated the two defendants were in
possession of a .25 caliber automatic pistol, operating a particular vehicle, and would be departing from a specific area.196 However, the
informant failed to reveal how he obtained that specific information.197 Hancock, along with a police investigator, decided to pursue this lead and located the two defendants in a vehicle.198 They
stopped the vehicle and stated they had information that a loaded
firearm was in their possession.199 Upon investigation, the police discovered the firearm under the front seat, out of plain sight.200
The court determined that in order for police observation to
establish probable cause, which permits a warrantless search based on
an informer’s failing to disclose the source of knowledge, it is insufficient to merely supply a large amount of information about noncriminal activity.201 The court reasoned that probable cause is established when details suggest or directly relate to criminal activity.202
This is simply to prevent an informant from passing along a rumor or
attempting to frame someone.203 An informant is considered to be reliable when the officer can confirm prior situations of reliability or
through personal observation that the tip corroborates the informant’s
information to prove he was telling the truth.204 It follows that when
the basis of the informant’s knowledge is not given, personal police
observation corroborative of data received from the informant should
be regarded as sufficient only when the police observe facts sugges193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204

Elwell, 406 N.E.2d at 473.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Elwell, 406 N.E.2d at 473.
Id.
Id. at 473.
Id. at 474.
Id.
Elwell, 406 N.E.2d at 473.
Id. at 474.
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tive of criminal activity.205 The court held that since the police failed
to observe criminal activity, they had no authority to stop or search
the defendant.206
Judge Jasen’s dissenting opinion suggests that the information
provided by the informant was sufficient because it was confirmed by
the officer’s own observations.207 Additionally, he noted the police
officers acted reasonably to stop the vehicle because they possessed
the necessary information and were able to verify its veracity. 208 Furthermore, he criticized the majority for striking down reasonable and
prudent law enforcement efforts that were used to protect members of
society.209
In People v. Moore, the New York Court of Appeals reasserted the principle established by the United States Supreme Court in
Florida v. J.L. that “[a]n anonymous tip cannot provide reasonable
suspicion to justify a seizure, except where the tip contains predictive
information—such as information suggestive of criminal behavior—
so that the police can test the reliability of the tip.”210 In Moore, two
police officers received an anonymous telephone tip advising them
that an 18-year-old black male was carrying a gun and wearing a gray
jacket and red hat was involved in a dispute.211 The officers arrived
at the scene a minute later and spotted the male but failed to observe
the dispute described in the tip.212 Next, the officers exited the vehicle and approached the defendant who walked away.213 They immediately drew their guns and yelled to the defendant not to move.214
The defendant kept walking but eventually put his hands up.215
While he was putting his hands up, he made a movement towards his
waistband.216 The officers searched him and discovered a gun in his
jacket.217 The defendant moved to suppress the gun.218
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218

Id. at 475.
Id. at 478.
Id. at 480 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
Elwell, 406 N.E.2d at 480 (Jason, J., dissenting).
Id.
Moore, 847 N.E.2d at 1143.
Id. at 1141-42.
Id. at 1142.
Id.
Id.
Moore, 847 N.E.2d at 1142.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The court found the police officer ultimately failed to exercise
the common law duty to inquire.219 They did not develop reasonable
suspicion until the moment the defendant made a movement towards
his waist.220 Therefore, when the police first ordered the defendant to
raise his hands, they did not have reasonable suspicion. The court
noted that an anonymous tip only allows reasonable suspicion when
the tip provides information that suggests predictive information concerning criminal behavior.221 Here, the anonymous tip failed to provide an accurate display of alleged criminal activity and failed to
provide predictive information.222 In addition, the defendant’s walking away from the police failed to establish cause for the police to
stop the defendant at gunpoint because the anonymous tip only
prompted a common law right of inquiry.223 Police may not detain
individuals to question them without reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.224 The court, relying on the United States Supreme Court’s
holding in J.L., found that the tip must be reliable in asserting an illegality instead of just a tendency used to identify a person. 225 The tip
at issue however failed to provide predictive information or indicate
criminal activity because the tip involved a man with a gun, and
when the police arrived at the scene one minute after the call, neither
a man with a gun was present nor was there an ongoing dispute.226
The anonymous tip did not provide the proper corroboration for the
search and seizure to be valid.227 Thus, it is evident that the court is
protecting individuals from false accusations for merely being in a
certain place without any indication of criminal activity.
In People v. Rios, a detective received a document with an
anonymous tip about an individual who possessed a gun.228 The police received this tip through a program that was designed for individuals to anonymously report the locations of illegal guns.229 The
219

Id.
Moore, 847 N.E.2d at 1142.
221 Id. at 1143; see J.L., 529 U.S. at 271 (holding that an anonymous tip that a black male
was standing on a corner wearing a plaid shirt and carrying a gun was insufficient to prove
reasonable suspicion to allow police to conduct a legal stop and frisk).
222 Moore, 847 N.E.2d at 1143.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id.
227 Moore, 847 N.E.2d at 1141.
228 Rios, 898 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
229 Id.
220
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tip provided that a black male, 23 years of age, and 150 pounds in
weight was in possession of an automobile that contained a gun under
the driver’s seat.230 The anonymous report stated that the automobile
was a gray four-door Pontiac and provided the license plate as well as
an address as to where the automobile would be located.231 The detective was unaware who provided the tip or how that individual obtained the information.232 Upon investigation, the detective discovered that the vehicle was registered to the address provided in the
tip.233 Next, the detectives went to the location and saw a vehicle
which matched the description as well as the person from the description.234 The two detectives approached the vehicle and observed the
defendant was acting nervous and fidgeting.235 They asked the defendant to step out of the vehicle and at this point they did not observe anything that would be considered criminal activity. 236 Eventually, the defendant admitted he had a gun in the vehicle.237
The court relied on J.L. to determine whether the search was
238
proper.
As stated above, an anonymous tip alone is not sufficient
to justify a seizure.239 The court reasoned that because the identity of
the person and the basis of the tip were unknown, anyone could have
reported the tip for any reason such as receiving an award.240 This tip
was not considered to be any more reliable than other anonymous
tips.241 Therefore, the seizure was improper because the anonymous
tip did not corroborate criminal activity.242
VI.

RECOMMENDATION FOR CHANGE IN NEW YORK LAW

Anonymous tips provide police with information they may
not ordinarily be able to obtain on their own. However, use of anonymous tips raises possible Fourth Amendment violations. Currently,
230
231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242

Id.
Id.
Id.
Rios, 898 N.Y.S.2d at 799.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 800.
Id.
Rios, 898 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 804.
Id. at 805.
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the Federal and New York State courts have different approaches to
determine when it is reasonable for law enforcement to stop an individual after receiving an anonymous tip. The Federal approach applies a “totality of the circumstances” test, which examines all the
facts of each individual situation.243 On the other hand, the heightened standard in New York State requires the two prong AguilarSpinelli criteria to be satisfied in order for police to rely on an anonymous source before it is reasonable to stop an individual.
Since Aguilar-Spinelli requires facts to specify the informant’s basis of knowledge and credibility, it is nearly impossible for an
anonymous tip to appropriately meet the requirements. Accordingly,
only a handful of states still adhere to Aguilar-Spinelli.244 Practically,
the only way for an anonymous tip to be sufficient to provide the police with reasonable suspicion to “stop and frisk” in New York is if
the Court of Appeals abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli test and adopted
the “totality of the circumstances” approach. Gates provides the totality of the circumstances to allow an anonymous tip to successfully
establish probable cause if the police are able to corroborate some of
the informant’s information.245 Information used to corroborate an
informant’s tip includes a license plate number, a description of
events or individuals, and an accurate description of future events.
Under the totality of the circumstances test, the police would be able
to legally stop and search more individuals based on an anonymous
tip.
Argyris opened the door to the possibility of New York’s
adoption of the totality of the circumstances approach in stating that
police can conduct lawful stops under either the totality of the circumstances test or the Aguilar-Spinelli test. However, the court in
243

Gates, 482 U.S. at 230-31.
Besides New York, the states that still apply Aguilar-Spinelli include: Alaska, Massachusetts, Tennessee, Vermont, and Washington. State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317, 322 (Alaska
1985) (holding the court is not persuaded to follow the Federal precedent and abandon Aguilar-Spinelli); Commonwealth v. Banville, 931 N.E.2d 457, 464 (Mass. 2010) (holding that
“Massachusetts has retained the two-prong reliability-basis of knowledge Aguilar-Spinelli
test”); State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn. 1989) (stating that “we adopt the twopronged standard voiced in Aguilar and Spinelli as the standard by which probable cause will
be measured to see if the issuance of a search warrant is proper . . . .”); State v. Goldberg,
872 A.2d 378, 381-82 (Vt. 2005) (holding “[t]he Aguilar-Spinelli standard strikes an appropriate balance between individual Vermonters’ right to privacy and the police’s important
interest in preventing crime”); State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 141 (Wash. 1984) (stating that
“[w]e are not persuaded by the United States Supreme Court's rationale for departing from
the Aguilar-Spinelli standard.”).
245 Gates, 482 U.S. at 230-31.
244
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Argyris failed to take the additional step of replacing Aguilar-Spinelli
with the totality of the circumstances approach. Argyris had the potential to be a ground-breaking case that aligned New York’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence with the majority of the states in applying
the totality of the circumstances anaylsis. Without this change, New
York is imprudently providing individuals with too much leniency
from governmental searches to the detriment of the general public.
Aguilar-Spinelli makes law enforcement’s job more difficult, but
confers additional Fourth Amendment protections that the United
States Constitution does not provide. On the other hand, the totality
of the circumstances makes law enforcement’s job easier and provides an individual with fewer Fourth Amendment protections.
Adopting a totality of the circumstances approach would still provide
individuals with Fourth Amendment protections. At the same time, it
would allow law enforcement to use anonymous tips, provided all the
circumstances in the situation are able to establish probable cause—
or maybe even reasonable suspicion.246
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Fourth Amendment provides individuals with privacy
rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Law enforcement
officials may, however, reasonably detain and search an individual by
successfully establishing the existence of probable cause to believe
that there is criminal wrongdoing. The Supreme Court initially established the Aguilar-Spinelli test to determine when an anonymous tip
allows law enforcement to conduct a warrantless stop. The United
States Supreme Court ultimately found that this standard focused
heavily on the constitutional rights of individuals and prevented law
enforcement from adequately performing their duties in preventing
crime. Eventually, the Court replaced Aguilar-Spinelli with the totality of the circumstances approach, which provides law enforcement
with greater flexibility to conduct a warrantless search from an anonymous tip.
New York is only one of six states that has yet to adopt the
more practical totality of the circumstances standard. The New York
Court of Appeals in Argyris may not have made the leap to implement the totality of the circumstances approach, but it took the step to

246

Arygris, 27 N.E.3d at 438 (Abdus-Salaam, J., concurring).
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open the door to adopt it in the future. If an anonymous tip provides
police with reliable information such as a license plate number, the
type of vehicle, a description of the individual, or the next steps of
the possible defendant, such as it did in Argyris, the totality of the
circumstances should apply and allow police to conduct a lawful
search. Perhaps a case in the near future will provide the New York
courts with the necessary facts to adopt the totality of the circumstances standard.
Amanda M. Dadiego
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